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A B S T R A C T
Background
Pharmaceuticals, while central to medical therapy, pose a significant burden to health care budgets. Therefore regulations to control
prescribing costs and improve quality of care are implemented increasingly. These include the use of financial incentives for prescribers,
namely increased financial accountability using budgets and performance based payments.
Objectives
To determine the effects on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures) of policies, that intend to affect
prescribers by means of financial incentives.
Search methods
We searched the following databases and web sites: Effective Practice andOrganisation of Care Group Register (August 2003), Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials (October 2003), MEDLINE (October 2005), EMBASE (October 2005), and other databases.
Selection criteria
Policies were defined as laws, rules, financial and administrative orders made by governments, non-government organisations or private
insurers. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes, and costs. The study had
to be a randomised or non-randomised controlled trial, interrupted time series analysis, repeated measures study or controlled before-
after study evaluating financial incentives for prescribers introduced for a jurisdiction or healthcare system.
Data collection and analysis
Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study limitations.
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Main results
Thirteen evaluations of budgetary policies and none of performance based payments met our inclusion criteria. Ten studies evaluated
general practice fundholding in the UK, one the Irish Indicative Drug Target Savings Scheme (IDTSS) and two evaluated German
drug budgets for physicians in private practice. The interrupted time series analyses had some limitations. All the controlled before-
after studies (all from the UK) had serious limitations.
Drug expenditure (per item and per patient) and prescribed drug volume decreased with budgets in all three countries. Evidence
indicated increased use of generic drugs in the UK and Ireland, but was inconclusive on the use of new and expensive drugs. We found
no clear evidence of increased health care utilisation and no studies reporting effects on health. Administration costs were not reported.
No studies on the effects of performance-based payments or other policies met our inclusion criteria.
Authors’ conclusions
Based on the evidence in this review from three Western European countries, drug budgets for physicians in private practice can limit
drug expenditure by limiting the volume of prescribed drugs, increasing the use of generic drugs or both. Since the majority of studies
included were found to have serious limitations, these results should be interpreted with care.
P L A I N L A N G U A G E S U M M A R Y
Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers
Drugs make up a major part of the amount of money spent on health care. Today, figures from across the world show that the amount
spent on drugs is increasing. Spending more on drugs could mean less money for hospitals, doctors or even schools and other non-
health care services. There is, therefore, pressure to control the costs of drugs while maintaining the quality of health care or avoiding
the increase in the use of health services.One way for governments, non-government agencies and health insurance companies to try to
control drug spending is to influence those who prescribe drugs through financial incentives. This review is about two types of financial
incentives that directly affect prescribers: drug budgets and performance based payments (e.g. bonuses or fines to improve prescribing
and reduce costs). We included 13 studies from the UK, Ireland and Germany that evaluated budgets, but no studies that evaluated
performance based payments.
Budgets are funds that are allocated by payers to a group of or individual physicians, thereby giving them financial responsibility for the
management of their own budget. Budgets provide incentives to prescribers to prescribe fewer and less expensive drugs (such as generic
drugs). This review found that in these three countries drug spending (per item and per patient) and the volume of drugs prescribed
decreased, with more prescribing of generic drugs. There was no clear evidence about the effects of budgets on health care utilization
(such as referrals to specialists). The effects on health were not reported in the studies. Overall the evidence for the effects of budgets is
weak.
B A C K G R O U N D
(Abbreviations used in this review are listed in Additional Table
1.)
The proportion of total healthcare expenditure spent on drugs has
continued to grow in numerous countries over the last decades
(Okunade 2006; Reinhardt 2002). For instance in the UK, pre-
scription costs in the 1990s were already the largest element of
the Family Health Services budget (Bradlow 1993), and in Spain
drug costs in primary care consume over 50% of total primary care
expenditure (Antonanzas 2003). Thus policy makers are under
pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely
affecting the quality of care. Unexplained variation in prescrib-
ing between individual physicians, different settings and countries
(Sturm 2005) and the fact that evidence as reflected in clinical
practice guidelines is often not adequately put into practice (Feely
1999), are reasons why regulatory measures targeted at prescribers
aim to improve the quality of prescribing.
While policymakers’ need for evidence grows, rigorous evaluations
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of regulatory measures are sparse. This review is part of a series
of Cochrane reviews of pharmaceutical policies (Aaserud 2006a),
investigating the effects of prescribing policies on drug and health
care utilisation, costs and health outcomes.
This review focuses on financial policies targeted at prescribers.
Policies targeted at prescribers that use educational interventions
will be addressed in a separate review.
The general trend to introducemarket elements in health care dur-
ing the last decades has been accompanied by decentralizing deci-
sion-making (Bligh 1992; Saltman 2002). For physicians, this has
led to an increased accountability for their use of resources (Wilton
1998), including prescribing. Budgetary arrangements for drugs
are one prominent example. Regulations also aim to counterbal-
ance market failure and focus on the quality of treatment. Qual-
ity-based payments are another type of financial incentive, which
are being used increasingly (e.g. in the UK and USA) (Giuffrida
2000; Rosenthal 2006; Rowe 2006; Trude 2006).
Other monetary regulations, such as the remuneration of physi-
cians, can also impact prescribing. However these do not specif-
ically target prescribing and are generally not considered phar-
maceutical policies. The restriction of reimbursement for patients
might also be considered as a physician centredmeasure since they
affect prescribing by physicians (Kanavos 1999). These policies,
however, are considered in other reviews (Aaserud 2006a). Phar-
maceutical policies for prescribers that use financial incentives,
which are included in this review are therefore limited to drug
budgets and quality based payments.
Drug budgets
Budgets are funds that are allocated by payers to a group or in-
dividual physicians, thereby giving them financial responsibility
for the management of their own budget (Wilton 1998). Budgets
therefore encourage economic behaviour and offer incentives for
savings. Drug budgets in particular aim at decreasing prescribing
costs.
Budgets vary with respect to the level where the budget is set (indi-
vidual practice or collective budgets), the range of services covered,
and the intensity of the incentives (rewards or risks). Additional
Table 2 provides a scheme of theoretical models including these
three variables.
In general, individual providers or physician representatives and
the payer negotiate budgets, depending on whether the budget is
on a practice, group or regional/national level. Payers are repre-
sented either by a (regional) health authority (UK), a social health
insurance scheme (Germany) or, as in the USA, a managed care
organization. The budgets are usually based on previous spending,
adjusted to patient mix or a defined target (e.g. the average spend-
ing of comparable practices, or 1% reduction of overall health care
spending, as in Italy). Most budgetary interventions were intro-
duced in the early to mid 1990s and adapted or abolished over
time. Budgets provide incentives to prescribe fewer and less ex-
pensive drugs. Physicians can modify drug volume by changing
the dosage or duration of treatment. Costs per item can be lim-
ited by increasing the use of generics or other less expensive drugs
with equivalent effects. Theoretically this can also slow down the
uptake of expensive new drugs with marginal benefits.
The intensity of the incentive is modified by several factors, one of
them being the magnitude of financial risk involved. This can be
potential fines (Germany, France) (Mossialos 2005), savings to be
used for improvement of medical services as in the UK (Coulter
1993) or Ireland (Walley 2000) or salary bonuses as in Spain or the
USA (Antonanzas 2003; Conrad 2004). Incentives are more direct
and stronger if applied on an individual level than at a group level
and depend on how much the budget level (target) is adapted to
provider specific circumstances. For instance in the UK high cost
patients and in Germany specific drug classes are exempt (Wilton
1998). The amount, type and timing of prescribing information
available to budget holders are important to enable prescribers to
react (Schreyögg 2005). Lack of useful information can also be
an impediment in effective contracting (Wilton 1998). Low per-
ceived financial risk will decrease the strength of the incentive and
depends on the likelihood that fines are actually executed or the
ability to influence the results personally versus being dependent
on a whole group.
Quality based payments
Quality based payment systems come in a variety of forms. They
are most often directed at all physician services and not just at pre-
scribing . Targets for these policies include administrative goals,
waiting time, patient satisfaction, diagnostic and treatment goals.
Prescribing policies include pay for performance and other poli-
cies offering bonuses or penalties to encourage improvement in
prescribing. Based on set performance standards physicians are re-
warded or punished for their prescribing (McNamara 2005).
Other reviews
We are not aware of any previous systematic reviews on the ef-
fects of financial incentives on prescribing. There are some re-
views on individual financial policies, like fundholding and the
indicative prescribing scheme in the UK (Coulter 1995; Garrison
2003;Gosden1997;Griffin 1996;Harrison 1996; Schwartz1996;
Smith 1998; Walley 1995) and broad reviews of pharmaceutical
policies (Bloor 1996; Ess 2003; Maynard 2003; Mossialos 2004;
Narine 1997). Most of those reviews are not systematic.
Other identified reviews focusing on effects of various financial
incentives on general medical practice, only occasionally addressed
prescribing or reported drug related outcomes. Chaix-Couturier
in her literature review of financial incentives, in addition to con-
sidering methodological issues, summarized trial results accord-
ing to the remuneration of physicians and - overlapping - the
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regulations related to managed care (Chaix-Couturier 2000). Ef-
fects of interventions on drug-use were reported from only two
settings: British fundholding and US managed-care. In the latter
case, prescribing was measured as a proxy for quality of care. Re-
views investigating the effect of different remuneration systems for
physicians (Bloor 1996; Chaix-Couturier 2000; Giuffrida 2000;
Gosden 1997; Gosden 2001; Maynard 2003) included only one
study out of a total of 25 that reported effects on drug utilisa-
tion or related costs (excluding immunization) for: the renewal
of prescriptions. Quality-based-payments are a relatively new ap-
proach and evaluations are scarce (Giuffrida 2000; McNamara
2005; Roland 2004; Rosenthal 2004).
The aimof this review is to support informeddecisions about phar-
maceutical policies and to guide future evaluations by preparing an
up-to-date, comprehensive summary of what is known from well-
designed research about the effects of financial incentives targeted
at prescribing on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes
and cost (expenditures). Complementary reviews of other phar-
maceutical policies are in progress. The review evaluating effects
of pharmaceutical pricing policies is published (Aaserud 2006). It
included ten studies of reference pricing and one study of index
pricing. Based on the evidence in this review, mostly from senior
citizens in British Columbia, Canada, reference drug pricing can
reduce third party drug expenditures by inducing a shift in drug
use towards less expensive drugs. No evidence of adverse effects
on health and no clear evidence of increased health care utilisation
was found.
O B J E C T I V E S
To determine the effects of prescribing policies using financial
incentives for prescribers on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health
outcomes and costs (expenditures).
M E T H O D S
Criteria for considering studies for this review
Types of studies
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised controlled
trials (CCTs), repeated measures (RM) studies (see ’Methods’ sec-
tion), interrupted time series (ITS) analyses, and controlled be-
fore-after (CBA) studies.
Types of participants
Health care consumers and providers within a large jurisdiction or
system of care. Jurisdictions could be regional, national or interna-
tional. Studies within organisations, such as health maintenance
organisations, were included if the organisation was multi-sited
and served a wider population.
Types of interventions
Prescribing policies (financial incentives): Policies that intend to
affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers.
Included in this category are management of drug budgets by pre-
scribers, indicative prescribing schemes, and other financial poli-
cies for prescribers such as pay-for-performance, if they are specif-
ically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation.
Policies in this review are defined as laws, rules, financial and ad-
ministrative orders made by governments, non-government or-
ganisations or private insurers. Interventions at the level of a single
facility were excluded.
Types of outcome measures
To be included a study had to include an objective measure from
at least one of the following outcome categories.
• Drug use (prescribed, dispensed or actually used).
• Healthcare utilisation.
• Health outcomes.
• Costs (expenditures), including drug costs and prices, other
health care costs and policy administration costs.
Search methods for identification of studies
The search to identify studies for this review was initially done as
a part of a much broader review, Pharmaceutical policies: effects
on rational drug use (Aaserud 2006), dealing with the effects of
all pharmaceutical policies. The broad review has been split into
several reviews, including this one.
Initial broad search for studies of pharmaceutical policies
We developed the search strategy without language restrictions.
The following databases were searched:
• Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group Register,
Idealist database searched 22 August 2003
• EBM Reviews, The Cochrane Central Register of
Controlled Trials, Third quarter 2003, Ovid, searched 15
October 2003
• MEDLINE Ovid, 1966 to June Week 1 2003, searched 18
June 2003
• EMBASE Ovid, 1980 to 2003 Week 23, searched 18 June
2003
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• CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts from 1975 to
present, searched 21 October 2003
• EconLit WebSPIRS from 1969 to present, searched 23
October 2003
• SIGLE, System for Information on Grey Literature in
Europe, WebSPIRS from 1980 to June 2003, searched 12
November 2003
• INRUD, International Network for Rational Use of Drugs,
searched 21 November 2003
• International Political Science Abstracts, WebSPIRS from
1989 to December 2003, searched 9 January 2004
• NHS EED, National Health Services Economic Evaluation
Database, CRD, searched 20 February 2004
• PubMed searched 25 February 2004 for relevant journals
not indexed in MEDLINE
• NTIS, National Technical Information service from 1964
to present, searched 3 March 2004
• PAIS International, Public Affairs Information Service,
WebSPIRS from 1972 to July 2003, searched 23 March 2004
• IPA, International Pharmaceutical Abstract, WebSPIRS
from 1970 to December 2003, searched 22 April 2004
The Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC)
database was tested and found not to be useful for this review.
In addition, we searched the following web sites and databases:
• World Bank e-Library, searched 4 May 2005
• WHO (World Health Organisation), browsed 25 August
2005
• OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) Publications & Documents, searched 30 August
2005
• SourceOECD, searched 30 August 2005
• World Bank Documents & Reports, searched 30 August
2005
The MEDLINE search strategy was mainly developed using re-
views cited in the background section of the protocol and their
references. The strategy includes terms for the following categories
of interventions:
• Regulation and classification (licensing) policies
• Patent and profit policies
• Marketing policies
• Policies that regulate the provision of drug insurance
• Policies that determine which drugs are reimbursed
• Restrictions on reimbursed drugs
• Prescribing policies
• Pricing and purchasing policies
• Regulation of sales
• Co-payment and caps
• Patient information
We used a modified version of the EPOC search strategy method-
ology filter to limit the MEDLINE strategy to randomized trials,
controlled trials, time series analyses and controlled before-after
studies.
Search strategies for most of the other databases were developed
on the basis of the MEDLINE strategy.
We screened the reference lists of all of the relevant reports that
we retrieved. Authors of relevant papers, relevant organizations,
and discussion lists were contacted to identify additional studies,
including unpublished and ongoing studies.
We performed a subsequent search for studies of financial incen-
tives for prescribers before publishing this review. Search strategies
were developed based on relevant parts and yields of the initial
broad search strategy.
MEDLINE (Ovid), 1966 to October Week 1 2005, searched 16
October 2005
EMBASE (Ovid), 1980 to 2005 Week 42, searched 16 October
2005
Global Jolis, online catalogue for the World Bank Country Office
PIC/Libraries, searched 19 January 2006
JOLIS, The Library Network serving the World Bank Group and
IMF, searched 19 January 2006
WHOLIS, theWHO library database, searched 19 January 2006
ISIWeb of Science, searched 28 April 2006 for cited key references
Data collection and analysis
Two authors (of HS, AA, JPK andMOA) independently reviewed
all of the search results, abstracts and reference lists of relevant
reports. The full text of potentially relevant reports was retrieved
(if one or both authors thought it was potentially relevant) and
two (of the above) authors independently assessed the relevance
of those studies and the limitations of included studies. The lead
author (HS) extracted data from included studies in collaboration
with one other author (AA, JPK or MOA). For all the steps in
the above process disagreements were resolved by discussion, if
necessary including another author (ADO).
Included study limitations
We used the standard quality criteria recommended by EPOC
to assess the methodological limitations of studies (risk of bias)
included in EPOC reviews (Section 6, EPOC 2002).
The criteria for RCTs and CCTs were:
1.concealment of allocation;
2.baseline measurement of outcomes;
3.follow up of professionals;
4.follow up of patients;
5.intention-to-treat analysis;
6.blinded assessment of primary outcomes;
7.reliable primary outcomes measures;
8.other risk of bias.
The criteria for CBA studies were:
1.baseline measurement of outcomes;
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2.baseline characteristics of studies using second site as control;
3.follow-up of professionals;
4.follow-up of patients;
5.reliable primary outcomes measures;
6.blinded assessment of primary outcomes;
7.protection against contamination;
8.other risk of bias.
Weused theEPOCdefinitionofRCT,CCT,CBAand ITS studies.
For ITS studies the definition is: “The study must have a clearly
defined time of intervention AND must have at least three data
points before and three data points after the intervention.”We also
considered designs where there was a control ITS group. Control
ITS (CITS) designs are conceptually similar to CBA design but
the addition of multiple time points pre and post intervention
decreases the likelihood of secular change bias.
Based on experience with two previous systematic reviews (Davey
2005, Grilli 2002), the statistical editor of EPOC, who is also a
co-author of this review (CR), suggested minor revisions to the
original EPOC criteria for ITS (and RM studies) reported in
Ramsay 2003. These consisted of defining reanalysed studies as
meeting the ’analysed appropriately’ criterion and allowing studies
that had at least 12 monthly data points pre and post to meet
the ’reason for number of data points’ criterion since this allows
seasonal effects to be investigated. These criteria more accurately
reflect the chance of bias in the study effect sizes. We therefore
used the following criteria.
1. The intervention was independent of other changes (protection
against secular changes). This was “MET” if there were compelling
arguments that the intervention occurred independently of other
changes over time and the outcome was not influenced by other
confounding variables/historic events during study period.
2. Data were analysed appropriately. This was “MET” if autore-
gressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models were used
OR time series regression models were used to analyse the data
and serial correlation was adjusted/tested for OR reanalysis per-
formed.
3. Reasons for number of data points were given. This was “MET”
if data for 12 months (or more) pre- and post-intervention was
used OR reason for the number and spacing of data points is given
OR sample size calculation performed.
4. Shape of the intervention effect was pre-specified. This was
“MET” if point of analysis was the point of intervention OR a
rational explanation for the shape of intervention effect was given
by the authors. Where appropriate, this should include an expla-
nation if the point of analysis was NOT the point of intervention.
5. Intervention unlikely to affect data collection (protection
against detection bias). This was “MET” if it is reported that in-
tervention itself was unlikely to affect data collection (for example,
sources and methods of data collection were the same before and
after the intervention).
6. Blinded assessment of primary outcome(s). This was evaluated
as protection against detectionbias. Thiswas “MET” if the authors
stated explicitly that the primary outcome variables were assessed
blindly OR the outcome variables were objective, e.g. length of
hospital stay, drug levels as assessed by a standardised test.
7.Completeness of data set. Thiswas “MET” if the data set covered
80-100% of total number of participants or episodes of care in the
study.
8. Reliable primary outcome measure(s). This was “MET” if two
ormore raters with at least 90%agreement or kappa greater than or
equal to 0.8 OR the outcome was obtained from some automated
system e.g. length of hospital stay, drug levels as assessed by a
standardised test.
9. Other risk of bias.
For CITS (controlled ITS) and CRM (controlledRM) studies, the
time series part of the studies were assessed independently from
the control part, using the above described criteria for ITS and
RM studies. The control series part of the study was assessed using
the CBA criteria above. If the control part had serious limitations,
it was not included and the study was classified as ITS or RM,
otherwise the control data were used as a control in the review.
Overall limitations for each main outcome within each study was
assessed by each of the data extractors using the following guide-
lines:
• No serious limitations = low risk of bias = all criteria scored
as ’met’
• Some limitations = moderate risk of bias = one or two
criteria scored as ’not clear’ or ’not met’
• Serious limitations = high risk of bias = more than two
criteria scored as ’not clear’ or ’not met’
• Fatally flawed = study results that we believed to be
untrustworthy based on an overall judgment of the risk of bias in
the study, based on all of the criteria used to assess the risk of bias.
Studies rated as “fatally flawed” were excluded from the review
but listed with the reason for exclusion in the Characteristics of
excluded studies table. Some setting dependent judgment (i.e.
judgment dependent on knowledge of the setting in which a study
was done) was used when assessing overall limitations. Where set-
ting dependent judgment has been used, the explanations are pro-
vided in Additional Table 3.
Data extraction
We extracted the following additional information from included
studies using a standardised data extraction form.
• Type of study (randomised trial, non-randomised trial,
repeated measures study, interrupted time series, controlled
before-after).
• Study setting (country, key features of the healthcare system
and concurrent pharmaceutical policies).
• The sponsors of the study.
• Characteristics of the participants (consumers, physicians,
practices, hospitals, etc.).
• Characteristics of the policies.
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• Main outcome measures and study duration.
• The results for the main outcome measures.
If duplicate results fromone of the four outcome groups (drug use,
health, health care utilisation and costs) were presented, these were
included if they provided additional information, which improved
understanding or lead to different conclusions from the original
paper.
Tables were prepared for each sub-category of intervention includ-
ing the following information: study identification, characteris-
tics of the intervention, results on drug use, healthcare utilisation,
health outcomes, and costs. These tables form the basis for the
primary qualitative analyses. In Table 4 and Table 5 we provide a
summary of all results per outcome. We also described potential
mechanisms through which the policies were intended to affect
drug use and costs and postulated mechanisms for other effects,
both intended and unintended. In addition we briefly listed and
described important policy options for which no evaluations were
found.
We attempted to identify important factors that might be taken
into consideration by anyone contemplating implementing any
of the policy alternatives, including: possible trade-offs (of the ex-
pected benefits versus harms and costs), different effects of varying
policy conditions and background situations, short versus long
term effects, limitations of the available evidence and other im-
portant factors that might affect the translation of the available
evidence into practice in specific settings.
Our confidence in the available estimates of effects was graded us-
ing a modification of the approach recommended by the GRADE
Working Group (GRADE 2004). When grading the quality of
evidence, we started out grading ITS and RM studies as ’Mod-
erate’ quality, and CBA studies as ’Low’ quality. This reflects our
impression that the results of ITS and RM studies were more com-
pelling (more likely to be correct) than those of CBA studies. The
GRADE quality scores are High, Moderate, Low, and Very low.
The following potential explanatory factors were considered: dif-
ferences in the characteristics of the policies, differences in the set-
tings and differences in study limitations. However, there was an
insufficient number of comparisons for similar outcomes across
studies to allow for meaningful exploration of heterogeneity.
CBA studies
For CBA studies we reported relative effects. For continuous vari-
ables we have reported, if possible, the relative change, adjusted
for baseline differences in the outcome measures; i.e. [(the ab-
solute post-intervention difference between the intervention and
control groups - the absolute pre-intervention difference between
the intervention and control groups) / the post-intervention level
in the control group]. In the case of UK fundholding results were
analysed separately for short-term (usually one year pre to one year
post) and long-term (two to up to four years) effects.
ITS and CITS studies
The preferred analysis method for ITS (and RM) studies was ei-
ther a regression analysis with time trends before and after the
intervention, which adjusted for autocorrelation and any periodic
changes, or ARIMA analysis. The results for the outcomes should
be presented as changes along two dimensions: change in level and
change in slope. Change in level is the immediate effect of the
policy and is measured as the difference between the fitted val-
ues for the first post-intervention data point (one month after the
intervention) minus the predicted outcome one month after the
intervention based on the pre-intervention slope only. The relative
change in level was calculated by dividing the change in level by
the predicted outcome one month after the intervention based on
the pre-intervention slope only and multiplying by 100%.
Change in slope is the change in the trend from pre to post in-
tervention that reflects the “long” term effect of the intervention.
Since the interpretation of change in slope could be difficult, we
chose to present the long-term effects similar to the way we calcu-
lated and present the relative immediate effects. We presented the
effects after half a year as the difference between the fitted value for
the sixth month post-intervention data point (half a year after the
intervention) minus the predicted outcome six months after the
intervention based on the pre-intervention slope only and dividing
by the predicted outcome six months after the intervention based
on the pre-intervention slope only and multiplying by 100%. The
effects after one year and two years were measured similarly. For
drug expenditures we also calculated the savings after a half year,
one and two years as the area between the predicted expenditures
curves and the actual expenditures.
Given that policy changes are often announced somemonths prior
to official implementation, a transition phase is often defined as
the six months from official announcement. If applied, all results
excluded the transition phase data. However, if studies provided
only few data points, if the data itself did not suggest a transition
phase, and most importantly, if the authors did not state a tran-
sition phase, it was not applied. Transition phase was used in one
study of this review (Harris 1996).
If papers with ITS design did not provide an appropriate analysis
or reporting of results, but presented the data points in a scannable
graph or in a table, we (CR, AV) reanalysed the data using meth-
ods described in Ramsay 2003. The following segmented time
series regression model was specified: Y(t) = B0 + B1*Pre-slope +
B2*Post-slope + B3*intervention + e(t) where Y(t) is the outcome
inmonth t. Pre-slope is a continuous variable indicating time from
the start of the study up to the last point in the pre-intervention
phase and coded constant thereafter. Post-slope is coded 0 up to
and including the first point post intervention and coded sequen-
tially from 1 thereafter. Intervention is coded 0 for pre-interven-
tion time points and 1 for post-intervention time points. In this
model, B1 estimates the slope of the pre-intervention data, B2
estimates the slope of the post-intervention data and B3 estimates
the change in level of outcome as the difference between the esti-
mated first point post intervention and the extrapolated first point
post intervention if the pre-intervention line was continued into
the post-intervention phase. The difference in slope is calculated
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by B2-B1. The error term e(t) was assumed to be first order au-
toregressive. For CITS studies, the difference between the relative
changes of the intervention and the control groups are presented.
Confidence intervals (95%) were calculated for all effect measures.
For studies that were analysed as CBA by the authors and reanal-
ysed as CITS by the reviewers, results were presented for both
methods, however for grading the quality of evidence, only the
ITS analyses were used.
R E S U L T S
Description of studies
See:Characteristics of included studies; Characteristics of excluded
studies.
The main literature search (for all pharmaceutical policies, not
only pricing policies) using electronic databases and web sites re-
sulted in 17.000 references to sift. The updated search for prescrib-
ing policies, including MEDLINE, EMBASE and Science Cita-
tion Index, resulted in 3521 additional references, including ref-
erence lists from relevant studies and reports. Roughly estimated
we sifted 20.000-21.000 references in total. We identified and re-
trieved in full text a total of 189 papers that were potentially rele-
vant for this review. Papers retrieved covered the following inter-
ventions: budgetary policies, remuneration of physicians (capita-
tion, fee for service), and pay for performance (including target
payments). If the study intervention qualified as a pharmaceutical
policy and specifically targeted prescribing behaviour, many still
were excluded because they did not meet the study design inclu-
sion criterion. They were primarily reviews, editorials, modelling
studies, cross-sectional studies, and before and after studies with-
out a control group. The Characteristics of excluded studies table
provides reasons for exclusion of those studies for which it is plau-
sible to expect that a reader would question why the study was
not included, studies that are well known but do not meet all of
the inclusion criteria, and ITS studies that meet all the inclusion
criteria except that there were too few data points.
We identified four studies (Dusheiko 2003; Elhayany 2001; Etter
1997; Houghton 1998) that might meet our inclusion criteria,
but these could not be retrieved and assessed before submission
of the review. The studies are listed amongst ’Studies awaiting
assessment’ in the reference list.
Sixteen papers, reporting 13 studies, met the inclusion criteria.
In 10 studies the effects of British fundholding were analysed
(Baines 1997c; Bradlow 1993; Burr 1992; Corney 1997; Harris
1996; Kammerling 1996; Rafferty 1997; Whynes 1997; Wilson
1995; Wilson 1999). One study analysed effects of the indica-
tive prescribing scheme in Ireland (Walley 2000). Two studies re-
ported on drug expenditure budgets in Germany (Guether 1995;
Schöffski 1997). Three studies were reported in more than one
paper (Bradlow 1993; Schöffski 1997; Wilson 1995). See the
Characteristics of included studies table for details.
Study designs
None of the studies were RCTs or CCTs or RM studies. We in-
cluded three CITS analyses (Harris 1996; Rafferty 1997; Wilson
1995), three ITS (Guether 1995; Schöffski 1997; Walley 2000)
and nine CBA studies (Baines 1997c; Bradlow 1993; Burr 1992;
Corney 1997; Harris 1996; Kammerling 1996; Rafferty 1997;
Wilson 1995; Wilson 1999). Three of those are presented as CBA
and CITS studies (Harris 1996; Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995). All
time series results were re-analysed by the review-team (AV, CR).
See ’Characteristics of included studies’ table.
Characteristics of the setting and interventions of included
studies
Although budgetary policies were applied in at least seven coun-
tries (see Table 6), evaluations could be included from only three
(UK, Ireland and Germany) (see Table 3).
UK fundholding
Fundholding for general practitioners (GPs) in England and Scot-
land was introduced with the first wave of voluntary practices in
April 1991 and inWales andNorthern Ireland in April 1993. Each
year practices with initially at least 11,000 registered patients could
join the fundholding scheme in “waves”, until in 1997 health care-
trusts were introduced. With each wave, regulations on requisites
for joining practices were relaxed. The aim of fundholding was
to increase efficiency of care by giving GPs financial control over
some of their provided services (Audit Comm. 1996; Glennerster
1996; Glynn 1992; Weiner 1990; Wilson 1995). Besides costs of
prescribed drugs, practice staff and a range of secondary care such
as specialist services and elective surgical services were covered by
separate budgets, with the drug budget offering the greatest sav-
ings potential (Harris 1996). Overspending in one budget had to
be covered by funds from another budget, savings could be used in
other areas of patient care (Coulter 1993). Budgets were set based
on previous expenditure and at the discretion of the local health
authority medical advisor. Therefore budgets varied substantially
from practice to practice (Day 1991). Concurrently all practices,
fundholders and non-fundholders alike were exposed to practice
level feedback with their own performance in comparison with
others (benchmarking), as well as to regular visits of independent
pharmaceutical advisors of the local health authority . Addition-
ally initiatives to reduce costs of individual prescriptions such as
limited lists and the promotion of generics were launched (Baines
1997).
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UK Indicative prescribing scheme
Introduced at the same time as fundholding (Bligh 1992; Dep. of
health 1989; Mannion 2005; Wilson 1995) and with budgets cal-
culated in the same way, indicative budgets meant, there was only
a virtual budget without penalty for overspending. The practices
could not individually retain the surplus, however, up to 50% of
the savings could be used by the regional Family Health Authority
for improvement of the regions’ primary care. Thus, this scheme
provided common savings as the only incentive. The schemeswere
also referred to as indicative prescribing amounts / budgets. In-
dicative prescribing budgets later became an integrated element of
the primary care trusts.
Indicative Drug Targeting Savings Scheme (IDTSS)
In 1993 in Ireland a comparable scheme called Indicative Drug
Targeting Savings Scheme (IDTSS)was introduced (Walley 2000).
GPs individual indicative or hypothetical budgets covered pre-
scribing and associated costs and were calculated based on previ-
ous spending and the national average (Walley 2000b). Savings
were split between the GP and the local health authority to be
used for the development of services. There were no penalties for
overspending.
German drug budget
Collective budgets for drug expenditures for physicians in pri-
vate practice in Germany were in use from 1993 to 2002 with
the stated goal to maximize effectiveness by using less costly and
more effective drugs. It was expected that while generic use would
increase use of drugs with disputed effect would decrease (Busse
1996; Gross 1994; Henke 1994; Schreyögg 2005; Schwartz 1996;
Schwermann 2003). While spending caps were regionally nego-
tiated or nationally set each year and made all physicians in pri-
vate practice in one region collectively liable, target volumes for
each individual practice were only theoretically established. From
2002 budgets were abolished and replaced by practice level tar-
get volumes (negotiated between the physician association (KV)
and insurers). No studies evaluating this regulation were included.
Parallel to the budgets, reference pricing, changing levels of co-
payment and price cuts for pharmaceuticals were introduced.
Characteristics of outcomes
Prescribing data in the UK in all studies was obtained from PACT
(Prescribing analysis and cost) data, which records costs and num-
bers of all dispensed NHS prescriptions of general practitioner
practices (Majeed 1997). Volume and costs were measured per pa-
tient or per adjusted patient unit (PU). PU accounts for increased
drug requirements in older patients; Astro-PU additionally cor-
rects for sex and temporary residents (see abbreviation list in Ad-
ditional Table 1). Changes in costs are also presented per item. An
item is defined as each preparation on the prescription.
In Germany included studies are based on data from regional
databases providing information of computerized general practi-
tioners and internists in private practice. Data collected were re-
ferrals to specialists and hospitals as well as total number of pre-
scriptions.
The Irish datawere derived from a regional health authority’sGMS
(General Medical Services) payments database. Prescribing data,
related to individual physicians, was reported quarterly for groups
of doctors.
Results are presented with short-term and long-term effects (when
available) in Additional Table 7 to Table 8, and summary of find-
ings can be found in Additional Table 4 and Table 5.
Risk of bias in included studies
The quality of included studies is presented in Additional Table 3.
For British fundholding drug use was assessed in six CBA studies
(Bradlow 1993; Burr 1992; Rafferty 1997; Whynes 1997; Wilson
1995; Wilson 1999), two ITS (Harris 1996; Wilson 1995), and
one CITS study (Rafferty 1997). Drug expenditure was assessed
by nine CBA studies (Baines 1997c; Bradlow 1993; Burr 1992;
Corney 1997; Harris 1996; Rafferty 1997; Whynes 1997; Wilson
1995;Wilson 1999), and the same two ITS and one CITS studies.
One CBA study that assessed referrals was included (Kammerling
1996). We reanalyzed all time series data.
All British CBA studies were assessed to have serious limitations
due to marked differences between the experimental and control
groups (selection bias). Most importantly fundholding was vol-
untary and requirements to join the scheme especially in the first
yearsmade it likely, that fundholders were a selected group with re-
spect to practice size, affluence, location and pre-fundholding lev-
els of prescribing (Coulter 1993; Gosden 1997; Moon 2002). Ad-
ditionally numerous simultaneous interventions were introduced
in both settings, which could not be accounted for in a CBA de-
sign. All ITS studies were recalculated based on graphs provided in
the publications, therefore of those studies (Harris 1996; Rafferty
1997; Wilson 1995) both CBA and (C)ITS results are provided.
Three studies (Harris 1996; Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995) were
assessed as having some limitations.
One ITS study assessed volume and drug costs of the Irish Indica-
tive Drug Targeting Savings Scheme (IDTSS). The quality was
rated as having some limitations.We included two ITS studies that
evaluated German drug budgets. Drug volume was assessed by
one (Guether 1995) and referrals by two (Guether 1995; Schöffski
1997). The quality of these data was rated as having some limita-
tions since data were quarterly rather thenmonthly and timeseries
had too few datapoints (Guether 1995), or due to limitations of
the data completeness (Schöffski 1997). In Guether 1995 data was
reported with a “quasi control group” (prescriptions for privately
insured patients not subject to budgets as opposed to socially in-
sured), but the groups were found to be too different to be used
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as reliable comparisons, and therefore only the ITS data of the
intervention group was used in the analysis.
Effects of interventions
Ten studies reported in 12 papers on British fundholding, one
study in one paper reported on Irish IDTSS and two studies in
three papers of German drug budgets met inclusion criteria. Of
all included studies data on drug use was provided by 12 studies
of which generic prescribing was reported in six studies, data on
drug expenditures based on dispensing by 10 studies and health
care utilisation (referrals) by three studies. Detailed results for the
included studies are provided in the Table 7 to Table 8, and the
summary of evidence can be found in Table 4 and Table 5. Con-
fidence intervals (CI) could only be calculated for ITS results. For
CBA results there were not enough data to calculate CIs.
British fundholding
Drug expenditure (Additional Table 7 and Table 9)
Eight studies provided data or information to calculate estimates
of the one-year and two-year effect on drug expenditure of fund-
holders relative to non-fundholders.
(1)--Drug expenditures per item
Mean costs for dispensed drugs per item in British fundholding
were reported in four CBA studies of which CITS results were
obtained for two studies. All measured outcomes (except one (
Wilson 1995, CBA, long term follow up: 0.34)) showed that the
real expenditure level of fundholders relative to the expected level
dropped more post intervention than those of non-fundholders.
Relative changes in levels of fundholders compared to controls for
the two CITS studies ranged from -49.17% to- 6.18% at one year
follow up (Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995), and showed mostly a
statistically significant, slight increase for longer follow-up periods.
Relative effects inCBA studies reporting results at one-year follow-
up (Bradlow 1993; Rafferty 1997) ranged from -6.3% to -5.3%
for all waves.
(2)--Drug expenditures per patient
Almost all available effects on costs per patient (reported in eight
CBA and three CITS studies), across different waves and follow-up
periods, consistently showed a bigger relative reduction in expen-
diture levels in fundholders. Relative level changes of fundhold-
ers compared to controls for CITS studies ranged from -79.7%
to 66.8% with a median of -2.8% at one year follow up (Harris
1996; Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995). While most confidence in-
tervals crossed no relative change, some relative changes became
statistically significant in long-term follow-up, and effects mostly
increased over time. The effect appears somewhat smaller in later
waves. CBA results of the same studies were in line with these
findings with a median of -4.2 % and a range between -9.5% and
0.5% after 12 months (Baines 1997c; Bradlow 1993; Burr 1992;
Corney 1997; Harris 1996; Rafferty 1997; Whynes 1997; Wilson
1995).
(3)--Total prescribing cost
The only study reporting changes in total prescribing costs (Harris
1996) found reductions for most follow-up periods and waves
(range at 12 months follow-up: -27.3% to -69.6%), though only
third wave results were significant at 12 months.
Drug use (Additional Table 10 and Table 11)
Seven studies provided data or information to calculate estimates
of the one-year and two-year effect on drug use by fundholders
relative to non-fundholders, and 6 studies reported on generic
prescribing
--Overall drug use
Four studies reported effects in 1st wave FH in GB (Burr 1992;
Bradlow 1993; Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995); three reported of
later waves (Rafferty 1997; Wilson 1995; Wilson 1999). In CITS
(median at 12 months -1.5%; range: -28.8% to +1.5%) as well
as in CBA studies (median at 12 months: -1.2%; range: -5.7%
to +1.8%) a relative reduction of prescribed drugs in fundholders
compared to controls was seen. The effect seemed to decrease with
later waves.
--Generic drug use
The effect on generic drug use was the most consistent across
waves and follow-up periods: all results reported in two CITS
studies and 5 CBA studies uniformly showed a greater increase
in use of generic drugs in fundholders, although effects of CITS
were not statistically significant (Rafferty 1997: median at 12
months: +15.0% (range -43.7% to 190.5%); at 24 months:
+18.3% (13.6% to 23.0%); Wilson 1995). Effects of CBA studies
ranged between 8.8% and 13.4% (median: 11.1%) at 12 months
(Bradlow 1993; Rafferty 1997), and between 4.0% and 17.2% at
24 months (Baines 1997c; Bradlow 1993; Rafferty 1997; Wilson
1995; Wilson 1999): (median: 10.6%).
--Use of specific drug subgroups
One included CBA study (Wilson 1999) reported the effect on
the use of newer or more expensive drugs for gastric ulcer and
depression. In both cases the use of newer drugs was relatively
lower in fundholders, however this was more pronounced for pro-
ton-pump inhibitors (adjusted relative change: -7.9%) than for
selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (relative change: -
0.8%).
Health
No study reported effects on health.
Health care utilisation (Additional Table 12)
One CBA study (Kammerling 1996) found a decreased relative
referral rate to NHS outpatient care for fundholders over long-
term follow-up (-15.3%).
Irish indicative drug target savings scheme (IDTSS):
Drug expenditures (Additional Table 13)
One ITS study evaluated the effects of IDTSS (Walley 2000).
While the change in costs per item over time was statistically non-
significant (relative change in level at 12 months: 0.6%), over-
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all prescribing costs had decreased absolutely. Compared with the
expected level without the policy change, the level was reduced
at 12 months (-18.0%) and at 24 months (-21.7%) after the in-
troduction of indicative budgets. However these results were also
statistically non-significant.
Drug use (Additional Table 14)
A relative reduction in number of prescribed items over a follow-
up period of one year (-8.2%) and two years (-10.1%) was found
(Walley 2000).
German drug budget
Two German studies were included (Guether 1995; Schöffski
1997) and reanalysed as ITS with some limitations.
Drug expenditures
No evaluations of cost effects of the German drug budget met our
inclusion criteria.
Drug use (Additional Table 15)
One (ITS-) study (Guether 1995) provided results on the overall
number of prescriptions.
The measured level relative to the expected level decreased from -
11.2% at three months to -13.4 % at 12 months). All results were
statistically non-significant.
Health care utilisation (Additional Table 8)
Referral rates of socially insured patients to outpatient special-
ists were reported in two studies (Guether 1995; Schöffski 1997)
and were inconclusive (relative effects: -15.4% to 13.2% at 12
months). One study (Schöffski 1997) reported results on referrals
to hospital with a relative immediate effect at 3months of 13.30%,
and 13.31% at 12 months.
UK Indicative prescribing scheme
Only one study was identified (Bateman 1996), but did not meet
our inclusion criteria. The study indicated that the prescribing
behaviour of the general practitioners in the study was similar
to that of the fundholding practitioners, and that the incentive
scheme did not seem to reduce the quality of prescribing.
D I S C U S S I O N
Although prescribing policies based on financial incentives are ap-
plied in various countries (see Additional Table 6), studies that
met the inclusion criteria for this review came from only three
countries and evaluated only budgetary policies. Cross-sectional
studies evaluating modifying factors such as practice character-
istics did not meet our study design criterion for inclusion (see
Characteristics of excluded studies table), but did provide relevant
information (Wilson 1995) that is considered in the discussion
below.
Additional Table 4 and Table 5 provide summaries of the main
findings. The evidence about the effects of budgetary policies is
strongest in British fundholding, although also there the quality of
the evidence is graded very low. Drug expenditures (per item and
per patient) and the amount prescribed decreased under budgets in
all three settings. There is evidence about increased use of generic
drugs from the UK and Ireland, while the effect on newer and
expensive drugs is inconclusive and the evidence is weak. There is
only weak and inconclusive evidence available about the effects of
drug budgets on referrals.
Drug budgets - Effects on drug expenditure
Firstly it was assessed, whether drug budgets would limit drug ex-
penditure as intended. Included studies reporting effects on costs
were from the UK and Ireland. British fundholders consistently
had slower increases in the cost per item than non-fundholders.
This effect was found in first wave fundholders (five studies, in-
cluding two CITS) as well as in later waves (two (CITS) studies)
and persisted during longer follow-up (three studies, including
one CITS). Costs per patient reported in eleven UK studies also
increased at a slower rate in fundholder practices and the effect
persisted with longer follow-up. The only included evaluation of
indicative budgets (IDTSS) indicated a decrease in the growth
rate of overall drug expenditures while maintaining constant costs
per item over time (Walley 2000). A decrease in drug expendi-
ture was also reported by other, not included studies from the UK
(Mannion 2005), (Burr 1992) as well as in Germany, a different
health care system with vastly different budgetary arrangements
(Schreyögg 2005).
Drug budgets - Effects on drug utilisation
Lower costs per item indicate use of generic drugs or other less
costly drugs. In eight included studies from the UK and Ireland
generic drug use consistently increased at a faster rate with budget
holding. We expected that this effect would decrease over time,
since a switch to generics can only happen once per patient (Walley
2004). Our results, however, did not support that: the effects for
long-term follow up were comparable (in CBA studies) and even
increased over time (Rafferty 1997).
Evidence from included studies about substitution with other
drugs is less strong. It was anticipated, that the proportion of
expensive, newer drugs for the same indications would decrease
under budgetary arrangements. Only one British study met our
inclusion criteria (Wilson 1999) and results showed that overall
drug costs and overall number of drugs per patient grew slower in
fundholders for two indications (anti-ulcer medication and anti-
depressant use). While the proportion of the more expensive pre-
scribed proton-pump inhibitors (PPI) grew slower in fundholders,
the proportion of SSRI’s for depression developed equally rapidly.
Lower costs per patient can be achieved by reducing the amount
or duration of prescribed drugs. Ranges and the majority of in-
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dividual outcomes of included British studies on dispensed items
per patient point to a slower increase of the number of dispensed
drugswith fundholding. Also the result from the evaluationof Irish
IDTSS (Walley 2000) showed a non-significantly slower growth
of drug use over time. Similarly, evidence from the included Ger-
man study with some limitations showed that prescriptions for pa-
tients subject to budgetary constraints decreased while effects for
privately insured patients were smaller. Thus drug budgets appear
to have decreased prescribing volume in all three settings.
Drug budgets - Effects on health care utilisation
Referrals, the only health care utilisation outcome reported, were
measured as an indicator of cost shifting rather than as a surrogate
measure of effects on health, and it is important to note that
these effects are likely due to a budget for referrals rather than to
a drug budget. In the UK it was expected, that referrals within
the NHS might decrease since those were subject to the budget
and their reduction would offer potential savings to be used for
service improvement. To compensate for that, it was expected
that physicians would increase referrals to private specialists, not
included under the budget (Coulter 1993) and by this create better
care structures for their patients (Moon 2002). Results of studies
that did notmeet the inclusion criteria did not support these claims
(Surender 1995). Three studies (Coulter 1993; Gosden 1997;
Howie 1995;Maxwell 1993) found neither lower referrals toNHS
specialists in fundholdingpractices nor a change in referrals outside
the NHS. However these studies have to be considered with care
as control or intervention practices were partly in the preparatory
phase for fundholding. Croxson (Croxson 2001) suggested that
the apparent lack of effect could also be due to pre-fundholding
inflation of referrals. This is supported by a study of prospective
fundholders (before and after negotiating budget setting), that
assessed referrals in old-age psychiatry (Fear 1994).Only one study
reporting referrals met our inclusion criteria (Kammerling 1996)
and it found that fundholders indeed slowed down referrals to
NHS orthopedic specialist outpatient care as compared to non-
fundholders.
In Germany by contrast, referring patients to a higher level of care
would save physicians prescribing costs billed to their budgets, so
an increase was expected for socially insured patients, but not for
privately insured patients without budgetary constraints.
This was not clearly supported by the evidence included in our
review. The two results for socially insured patients both found
a statistically non-significant increase in referrals, but at one-year
follow-up the results were contradictory (Guether 1995; Schöffski
1997). The absolute effects for privately insured patients assessed
by Güther (Guether 1995) were smaller but paralleled the overall
development. These findings are supported by descriptive data
reported by Schöffski 1997.
Quality of care and modifying factors
Effects on quality of care
No studies reported effects on health outcomes or the quality of
prescribing. The effect on treatment quality can therefore only be
estimated indirectly. In theory, quality might suffer if necessary
treatment were withheld or postponed. The reduction found in
prescriptions in all settings could indicate a potential quality prob-
lem. In Germany however, descriptive nationwide data indicate
that the overall decrease of prescriptions after the introduction of
the budgets was mainly due to a reduced use of drugs with dis-
puted effectiveness, such as expectorant drugs, medication against
dementia and medication to treat neuropathies (Schreyögg 2005).
Evidence about the use of expensive new drugs in all settings is
inconclusive. Evidence is clearest for the increased use of generic
drugs, which is generally considered to be “quality neutral” (Walley
2004); that is, would not be expected to have an impact on the
quality of care or health outcomes.
Changes in referrals to other sectors might be the result of under
treatment. At the same time, however, quality might increase by
the involvement of specialist care (Schreyögg 2005). With UK
fundholding the change in referral patterns (Ess 2003; Narine
1997; Walley 2004) might have induced additional local health
care capacities (Coulter 1995; Glynn 1992), thus possibly having
a positive effect on quality, although the creation of a two-tear
system was feared. Several excluded studies reported newly created
clinics at health centres and reduced waiting times, making organ-
isation of care more effective (Bain 1993; Croxson 2001; Jones
1993; Kammerling 1996). However, again, this was probably not
attributable to drug budgets, but to fundholding for referrals.
Evidence from this review does not clarify effects on quality of care
or health outcomes.
Savings
We did not find direct evidence about generated savings. The
slower increase in drug expenditure with budget holding, at least
over the first year of follow-up, potentially generated savings. Wil-
son for instance, based on regional British results, calculated hypo-
thetical national savings over the first three years of fundholding to
be £72 million (Wilson 1995). However this effect of fundholding
was perceived as minor relative to the continuing absolute increase
in spending (Stewart-Brown 1995, see Bradlow 1993). National
drug expenditures still grew more than the government’s forecast
during the first two years of the policy (Jones 1993). Sustainability
has also been questioned based on the results of an excluded study
(Rietveld 2002; Stewart-Brown 1995). The results of this review,
however, do not indicate a decrease in effect for longer follow-up
periods.
In Germany national trends in sales or turnover are difficult to
interpret due to German reunification. However, sickness fund ex-
penditures decreased markedly after the introduction of the bud-
gets in 1992 for drugs with disputed effects, while expenditures
for drugs with undisputed effects continued to rise (Schreyögg
2005). On the other hand the demonstrated increase of referrals
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could offset generated savings as indicated by Schöffski (Schöffski
1997).
Modifying factors
Different factors may modify the effects, but studies of modifying
factors are generally cross-sectional and did not meet our inclu-
sion criteria. The magnitude of the financial risk, which can be
postulated to be a key-modifying factor, is dependent on the abso-
lute budget level, the directness of potential savings, costs or losses
involved, and the range of services covered under the budget.
Since budgets usually are set based on previous levels of prescrib-
ing, an anticipatory increase of prescribing was feared but could
not be clearly confirmed by evidence from the UK (Coulter 1995;
Croxson 2001; Healey 1994; Stewart-Brown 1995) or Germany.
Some authors have concluded that irrespective of changes in pre-
scribing, UK fundholders were more often able to keep within
their budgets (Jones 1993). However since the strictness of ne-
gotiated budgets was very inconsistent and fundholding budgets
generally considered generous (Glynn 1992), this evidence is weak
(Robinson 1996). In Germany Guether 1995 attributed the in-
crease in prescriptions in the three Autumnmonths before the start
of the policy to anticipatory hoarding by patients, while seasonal
variation cannot be excluded by the presented data.
Other modifying factors include the health care setting and other
concurrent policy changes. In the UK, for instance, benchmark
information along with virtual budgets was also introduced for
non-fundholding practices, while in Germany this information
was unavailable. In the UK regular visits by independent pharma-
ceutical advisors of the local health authority were introduced and
Health Promotion Clinics (DMP) were included in the 1991 GP
contract (Stewart-Brown 1995). Pharmaceutical detailing activi-
ties might be different in the two countries. In Germany patients
could change theirGP or attend any specialist if the expectedmed-
ication was not prescribed (Schwermann 2003), while in the UK,
where GPs act as gatekeepers for specialist care patients might have
a closer bonding (HitCP-UK 1999). In Germany co-payments of
drugs were changed repeatedly (Schwermann 2003). Other po-
tential modifying factors include reference-pricing (Schwermann
2003), other drugpricing and formulary regulations, practice char-
acteristics and marketing effects (Stewart-Brown 1995) (see Addi-
tional Table 16).
From the available evidence it is not possible to distinguish the
impact of any of thesemodifying factors (Coulter 1995). Therefore
there is substantial uncertainty concerning the transferability of
results to other settings.
Methodological issues/limitations
Comparability of the presented results, even from within one
country, is limited due to the following aspects. (1) Studies from
the UK used different units (e.g. per prescribing units (PU) and
per patient, median or mean). (2) Prescribing volume was mostly
measured in dispensed items per patient, where a change in the
true volume (for example, shorter prescriptions or lower dosage)
cannot be detected. However, a systematic change in item size be-
tween fundholders and non-fundholders during the study periods
is not to be expected (Wilson 1995).
In the UK, selection bias was likely because of specific practice
characteristics of fundholders such as practice size (Dixon 1994;
Moon 2002). Other relevant characteristics mentioned were train-
ing status, deprivation score (Whynes 1995) and the possibility to
dispense (Rafferty 1997; Whynes 1995). The risk of selection bias
for all CBA results of fundholding might lead to an overestima-
tion of the effect. The same was true for the study populations of
the included German studies, where only computerized practices
were included.
If possible, CBA studies were reanalysed as ITS studies. Although
the effect sizes cannot be directly compared the consistence of the
effect direction over time strengthens the evidence.
Evidence from this review is largely in accordance with common
interpretations of fundholding effects in the UK. While overall
drug expenditure continued to grow, fundholders seemed to be
able to contain prescribing costs slightly better (Bloor 1996; Ess
2003; Mannion 2005; Narine 1997; Walley 2004; Wilson 1995).
This effect seems to be partly the result of switching to generics
or other less expensive drugs (Bloor 1996; Ess 2003; Gosden
1997; Narine 1997; Walley 2004), and partly due to decreased
prescribing volume (Gosden 1997; Narine 1997; Rietveld 2002;
Walley 2004). The effects might decrease over time (Bloor 1996;
Rietveld 2002), however the evidence clearing this review does not
support this.
Results of the review also support conclusions from narrative re-
views (Bloor 1996; Schwermann 2003; Walley 2004) about the
German collective budget. Overall prescriptions decreased imme-
diately after introduction of the spending caps. No German data
on cost and generic use met our inclusion criteria. Commonly
the decrease in drug expenditure along with increased generic use
(Bloor 1996; Walley 2004) was at least partly attributed to the
drug budgets, despite other concomitant interventions such as
price cuts and co-payments (Walley 2004). No studies with long-
term follow-upmet our inclusion criteria. The effects of budgetary
policies in New Zealand have been interpreted similarly (Bloor
1996).
A U T H O R S ’ C O N C L U S I O N S
Implications for practice
Although financial incentives are considered to be an important
element of strategies to change prescribing patterns (Grol 2000;
Rutledge 1996) only studies on budgetary policies from three
countries met our inclusion criteria. Due to methodological lim-
itations, overall the evidence is weak. It supports the conclusion
that drug budgets can decrease prescribed drug volume and drug
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expenditure. Results on health care utilisation and quality of care
were inconclusive. Administration costs were not reported.
Implications for research
Our review found fewwell-designed evaluations of pharmaceutical
prescribingpolicies. Althoughwe performed an extensive literature
search, there could be additional studies in the grey literature, such
as working papers or internal government reports that we have
not identified. Updates of this review will include further efforts
to identify studies in the grey literature.
Compared to budgetary policies elsewhere, British fundholding
has been relatively extensively evaluated, albeit with important
limitations. Some of the studies included in this review could be
recalculated as ITS (with controls in the UK setting), but au-
thors mostly presented controlled before after designs for drug
use, drug costs and health care utilisation outcomes. Such observa-
tional designs have serious limitations. No randomised trials were
conducted. However well done studies, including trials could be
applied to evaluate drug policy interventions if planned in ad-
vance. They might be done more quickly and efficiently than ob-
servational studies, and could reduce the risk of bias (Schneeweiss
2004).
Evaluations in the majority of included studies focus on relatively
short term outcomes. Longer-term analyses would provide impor-
tant supplementary evidence, but the risk for bias related to other
confounding interventions increases with the length of the obser-
vation period.
Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects and they
might cause harm as well as benefits, it is important that they
are properly evaluated. Evaluations should be planned ahead of
introducing the policies and should be a routine part of the policy
process.
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C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F S T U D I E S




Participants Setting: UK, Linconshire and Devon
Fundholders (FH)






Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use (generics)
Costs (per patient)




Participants Setting: UK, Oxford
FH (1st wave): 5
Non-FH: 7
Unit: Practice
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use: (Items, generics)
Costs (per patient, per item)
Cost: Total net cost, per 1000 PU, Mean cost per item, Net cost per 1000 PU , Mean cost per item
Notes Dispensing group excluded from analysis since not comparable with control group
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Participants Setting: UK, Mid- Glamorgon
FH (1st wave): 4
Non-FH: 4
Unit: Practices
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding






Participants Setting: UK, South Thames Region
FH (2nd wave): 4
Non-FH:4
Unit: Practice
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Costs (per patient)




Participants Setting: West Germany Statutory health insurance
General practitioners: 82
Unit: GPs
Interventions German drug budget
Outcomes Drug use (prescriptions)
Health care utilisation (referrals)
Notes
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Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding





Participants Setting: UK, District Health Authority in South West England
FH (2nd and 3rd wave): 10
Non-FH: 22
Units: Practice
Fundholders 2nd and 3rd wave: 10
Non- fundholders: 22
Units: Practice
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Healthcare utilization (referrals) hospitals




Participants Setting: UK, Northern Ireland
FH (1st wave): 23
FH (2nd wave): 34
FH (3rd wave): 9
Non-FH: All in Northern Ireland
Unit: Practice
Fundholding 2nd wave: 34
Fundholding 3rd wave: 9
Non- fundholders: All in Nortern Ireland
Unit: Practice
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Rafferty 1997 (Continued)
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use (prescriptions, generics)





Participants Setting: Germany, Statutory Sickness Funds
309- 382 practices
Unit: Practice
Interventions German drug budget





Participants Setting: Ireland, Eastern Health Board cohort of
223 General practitioners
Unit: GPs
Interventions Ireland Indicative Drug Targeting Savings Scheme (IDTSS)
Outcomes Drug use (Items)





Participants Setting: UK, Lincolnshire
FH (4th wave): 23
Non-FH: 63
Unit: Practice
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Whynes 1997 (Continued)
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use: (items, generics)
Costs: (per patient)




Participants Setting: UK, North West Regional Health Authority
FH (1st wave): 20
FH (2nd wave): 31
FH (3rd wave): 49
Non-FH: 312
Unit: Practice
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use: (items, generics)
Cost:






5 health Authorities in NW-Region
Interventions UK, NHS Fundholding
Outcomes Drug use: (DDD, drug subgroups)
Cost: (per patient, per DDD)
Notes
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Characteristics of excluded studies [ordered by study ID]
Study Reason for exclusion
Bain 1993 No control group
Baines 1997 Cross-sectional
Baines 1997b No baseline data
Bateman 1996 Observational study/ no control group
Chernew 2000 No baseline/ no control group
Coulter 1993 Not adeqate control group
Danzon 1997 Multiple interventions measuered simultanously, effects of drug budgets can not be extractet separately
Edgar 1999 No baseline data
Fear 1994 Evaluated only a pre-fundholding pilot project, with no real incentives
Hoopmann 1995 Cross sectional
Howie 1995 Evaluates a “shadow fundholding” project, pre-fundholding. Overlaps with the start of real fundholding
Jünger 2000 No control group
Malcolm 1999 No control group
Malcolm 2001 No control group
Maxwell 1993 Evaluates a “shadow fundholding” project, pre-fundholding. Overlaps with the start of real fundholding
Newton 1993 No control group
Schreyögg 2004 Untrustworthy data because of time series strongly influenced by historical event (Germany reunification)
Schreyögg 2005
Whynes 1995 Untrustworthy results, intervention groups are at different stages of fundholding
Whynes 1997b No control group
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D A T A A N D A N A L Y S E S
This review has no analyses.
A D D I T I O N A L T A B L E S
Table 1. Abbreviations
CBA Controlled before and after
CCT Controlled clinical trial
CI Confidence interval
CITS Controlled interrupted time series
CRM Controlled repeated measures
DMP Disease management program
EPOC Effective Practice and Organisation of Care
FH Fundholding (fundholders)
H2RA Histamine-2 receptor antagonist
GP General Practitioner
Item is defined as each preparation on the prescription
ITS Interrupted time series
IDTSS Indicative Drug Target savings scheme (Ireland)
NIC Net ingredient costs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACT Prescribing analysis and cost (data used in British fundholding)
PPI Proton pump inhibitors
PU Prescribing unit, allows for demographic differences between practices. Patients under 65 are counted as one prescribing
unit, while those aged 65 and over count as three. AstroPU in addition corrects for age, sex and temporary residency
RCT Randomised controlled trial
RM Repeated measures
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Table 1. Abbreviations (Continued)
RR Risk ratio (intervention vs control group)
RR (adj) Risk ratio (adjusted for pre intervention differences) = RR post intervention / RR pre intervention
SSRI Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
WHO World Health Organisation
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Table 3. Assessment of limitations in included studies (Continued)
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Table 4. Summary of findings*. Effects of UK Fundholding (UK)
Outcome No of studies Median relative eff Quality Comments
Drug use (number of
drugs prescribed per pa-
tient)
3 [1] Relative change: -1.6 %
(-28.9 to 1.5)
Very low [2,3]
Use of generics 2 [4] Relative change: 15 %
(-43.7 to 190.51)
Very low [2,3]
Cost per item 2 [5] Relative change: -44.3 %
(-49.2 to -6.2)
Very low [2,3]
Cost per patient 3 [6] Relative change: -2.7 %
(-79.7 to 66.8)
Very low [2,3]
Total prescribing cost 1 [7] Relative change: -50.6 %
(-69.6 to -27.3)
Very low [2,3]
Inpatient referrals 0 - -




are ranges of results of in-
dividual studies, nometa
analyses were performed
For Footnotes see Addi-
tional table 14
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Table 5. Summary of findings. Effects of German drug budget
Outcome No of trials Median relative eff Quality Comments
Drug use (number of
drugs prescribed per pa-
tient)
1 [8] Relative change: -13.4 % Very low [9,10]
Use of generics 0 - -
Cost per item 0 - -
Cost per patient 0 - -
Total cost 0 - -
Inpatient referrals 1 [11] Relative change: 13.3 % Very low [9,10]
Outpatient referrals 2 [12] Relative change: 13.2 % to -
15.4 %
Very low [9,10]
[1] There were 3 con-
trolled interrupted time
series (ITS) analyses and
5 controlled before-after
(CBA) studies. Only the
controlled ITS analyses
are included here. The 3
controlled ITS include 3
comparisons from wave
1, and 7 comparisons
from later waves
[2] Fundholding prac-
tices were all self-selected
and there is uncertainty
about how comparable
they are to practices that
chose not to participate
in fundholding
[3] There is uncertainty
about how direct the ev-
idence, which all comes
from the UK National
Health Service, is for
other health care systems
[4] There were 2 con-
trolled interrupted time
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Table 5. Summary of findings. Effects of German drug budget (Continued)
series (ITS) analyses and
5 controlled before-after
(CBA) studies. Only the
controlled ITS analyses
are included here. The
2 controlled ITS anal-
yses include 2 compar-
isons from the first wave
and 4 from later waves
[5] There were 2 con-
trolled interrupted time
series (ITS) analyses and
3 controlled before-after
(CBA) studies. Only the
controlled ITS analyses
are included here. The
2 controlled ITS anal-
yses include 2 compar-
isons from the first wave
and 3 from later waves
[6] There were 3 con-
trolled interrupted time
series (ITS) analyses and
6 controlled before-after
(CBA) studies. Only the
controlled ITS analyses
are included here. The
3 controlled ITS anal-
yses include 3 compar-
isons from the first wave
and 7 from later waves
[7] 1 controlled ITS,
with 3 comparisons from
second and later waves
[8] 1 CBA study that in-
cludes waves 2 and 3 in a
single comparison
[9] Long term effect (24
months), short term not
reported
[10] 1 ITS study with
one outcome
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Table 5. Summary of findings. Effects of German drug budget (Continued)
[11] The time series
had too few data points,
and the intervention was
not independent of other
changes since other drug
policies were introduced
in the same period
[12] There is uncertainty
about how direct the ev-
idence, which all comes
from Germany, is for
other health care systems
[13] 1 ITS study with
one outcome
[14] 2 ITS studies with
one outcome each
Table 6. Description of other identified budgetary policies that did not meet the inclus
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Table 7. Effects on drug expenditures: UK Fundholding, CITS studies (Continued)
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Table 9. Effects on drug expenditures: UK Fundholding, CBA studies











Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 -0.5 -6.3
Rafferty 1997 Wave 1 -0.4 -5.5 -8.1
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 - - -5.2*/***
Wilson 1995 Wave 1 - - -0.9*
Rafferty 1997 Wave 2 -0.5 -5.3 -9.9
Rafferty 1997 Wave 3 -0.5 -5.3 n.a.
Wilson 1995 Wave 2 - - 0,3*
Wilson 1995 Wave 3 - - -0.3*
Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - - -2.8**
COST PER ITEM
PPIs
Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - - -1**
COST PER ITEM
SSRIs
Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - -1.9 -2.7**
COST PER PA-
TIENT
Rafferty 1997 Wave 1 -8.4 -9.5 -15.3
Burr 1992 Wave 1 -0.6 -4.5 -
Harris 1996 Wave 1 -1.2 -3.2 -7.7
Wilson 1995 Wave 1 - - -7.9*
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 -0.8 -4.6 -
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Table 9. Effects on drug expenditures: UK Fundholding, CBA studies (Continued)
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 -1.1 -6.2 0.4*/***
Rafferty 1997 Wave 2 -7.2 -7.2 -13.9
Rafferty 1997 Wave 3 -7.7 -7 -
Baines 1997 Lin-
colns
Wave 1-3 - - -18.5*
Baines 1997 Devon Wave 1-3 - - -16.4*
Whynes 1997 Wave 4 -0.7 - -
Corney 1997 Wave 2 0.2 0.5 -4.8
Harris 1996 Wave 2 -1.7 -4 -6.4
Wilson 1995 Wave 2 - - -7.1*
Harris 1996 Wave 3 -1.8 -3.7 -4.4
Wilson 1995 Wave 3 - - -2.7*
Harris 1996 Wave 4 -1.8 -3.4 -5.6










Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - - -1.9**
All costs in Brit. £,
if not noted other-
wise, price year not
specified
*3 year f/u
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Table 9. Effects on drug expenditures: UK Fundholding, CBA studies (Continued)
**Combined wave
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Table 10. Effects on drug use: UK Fundholding, CITS studies (Continued)

























































































Table 11. Effects on drug use: UK Fundholding, CBA studies












Burr 1992 Wave 1 18 0.8 -
Rafferty 1997 Wave 1 -461 -4 -5.2
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Table 11. Effects on drug use: UK Fundholding, CBA studies (Continued)
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 40 1.8 -
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 - - 3,6**/****
Wilson 1995** Wave 1 - -5.7* -
Rafferty 1997 Wave 2 -218 -1.8 -2.6
Rafferty 1997 Wave 3 -211 -1.7 -
Wilson 1995* Wave 2 - - 0.8**
Wilson 1995* Wave 3 - - -5.6**
Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - - 39.2***
Whynes 1997 Wave 4 - -1.2 -
GENERIC
PERCENTAGE
Rafferty 1997 Wave 1 3.2 12.7 16.1
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 4.1 8.8 -
Bradlow 1993 Wave 1 - - 17.2**/****
Wilson 1995 Wave 1 - - 12.1**
Rafferty 1997 Wave 2 2.4 9.5 13.6
Wilson 1995 Wave 2 - - 10,1**
Rafferty 1997 Wave 3 3.4 13.4 -
Wilson 1995 Wave 3 - - 10.3**
Baines 1997 Lin-
colns.
Wave 1-3 - - 10.7**
Baines 1997 Devon Wave 1-3 - - 9.5**
Whynes 1997 Wave 4 3.5 - -
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Table 11. Effects on drug use: UK Fundholding, CBA studies (Continued)









Wilson 1999 Wave 3/4 - - -7.9***
PERCENTAGE
SS-
RIs OF ALL ANTI-
DEPRESSANT
DRUGS [DDD]









Table 12. Effects on health care utilization (referrals): UK Fundholding, CBA studies













51Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers (Review)
Copyright © 2011 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Table 12. Effects on health care utilization (referrals): UK Fundholding, CBA studies (Continued)
Kammerling 1996 Wave 2/3 -18.9 - -15.3
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Table 14. Effects on drug use: Ireland Indicative budgets (IDTSS), ITS studies (Continued)


















































Table 16. Factors that could modify the effects of drug budgets
FACTOR DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
Budget (target) level Level of set budget should offer room for
improvement but be reachable
If too high or too low:
Drug use: Less shift towards cheaper drugs
Drug expenditure: Less decrease
Health care utilisation: Setting dependent
Patient drug expenditures: Setting depen-
dent




Themore direct the effect for the individual
prescriber, the stronger the effects
Incentives / disincentives - Only savings can be achieved
- only punishments
- both
Services covered under the budget If only prescribing costs are subject to a
budget, costs might be shifted to other sec-
tors of care
Drug use: Decrease
Referrals: Increase if not covered in budget
Health: Decrease if care is delayed, in-
creased if more specialist care or shorter
waiting time
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Table 16. Factors that could modify the effects of drug budgets (Continued)
Health care utilisation: Increase
Available feedback information Should be available to prescribers in order
to react
Drug use: Less shift towards cheaper drugs
or overreaction
Drug expenditure: Less decrease





Should not be introduced simultaneously
if individual effects should be assessed
Drug use: Unclear
Health: Unclear
Health care utilisation: Unclear
Gatekeeping, patient lists If primary care physician acts as gatekeeper
and patients have a limited choice of care
provider, physicians might be less depen-
dent on patients preferences
Drug use: Less shift towards cheaper drugs
Drug expenditure: Less decrease
Health: Unclear
Health care utilisation: Increase
Practice characteristics - Practice size
- Level of organization, efficiency
- number of partners
Drug use: Less shift towards cheaper drugs
Health: Decrease
Health care utilisation: Increase
Patient drug expenditures: Increased
Dispensing practices Practice can dispense medicines Drug use: Bigger shift towards cheaper
drugs
Drug expenditure: Stronger decrease
A P P E N D I C E S
Appendix 1. Search strategies: MEDLINE OVID
The MEDLINE Ovid search strategy used both MeSH terms and text words (tw):
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17. (physician$ or GP? or doctor? or prescriber? or group pract$ or institutional pract$ or partnership pract$ or family pract$ or
general pract$ or office pract$ or private pract$ or primary pract$ or nurse or nurses).tw.
18. (pharmacist? or pharmacies or pharmacy).tw.
19. hospital?.tw.
20. or/1-19
21. *Drug Information Services/
22. *Pharmacists/




27. *Education, Medical, Continuing/
28. *Education, Nursing, Continuing/










39. *“Salaries and Fringe Benefits”/
40. *Benchmarking/
41. *Drug Monitoring/
42. *Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/





48. (continuing adj1 education).tw.
49. (guideline? adj1 (disseminat$ or implement$ or compliance or adherence or distribut$)).tw.
50. ((drug? or pharmaceutic$ or prescrib$ or prescrip$) adj1 budget?).tw.
51. (incentive? adj1 (plan? or money$ or financ$ or payment? or reimburs$)).tw.
52. capitation.tw.
53. (salaries or salary or income? or wages or fringe benefit?).tw.
54. benchmarking.tw.
55. ((review or report$ or monitor$ or surveillance or evaluat$) adj1 (drug use? or drug utilization or drug utilisation or prescrib$ or
prescrip$)).tw.
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58. (letter? or mail$).tw.
59. (telephon$ or phon$).tw.
60. ((academic or group) adj1 detailing).tw.
61. fundhold$.tw.




66. *“Drug Utilization Review”/
67. ((prescrib$ or prescrip$) adj2 (attitude or variation? or behavior or behaviour or pattern? or practice? or habit? or accurate or
trend? or cost? or effect? or change? or shift$ or rational or reduc$ or improv$ or influenc$ or expenditure? or rate? or data)).tw.




72. randomized controlled trial.pt.




77. (time adj series).tw.

















95. 93 not 94
96. 92 or 95
97. 20 and 63 and 69 and 88
98. 97 not 96
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Appendix 2. Search strategies: EMBASE
EMBASE Ovid
















16. (physician$ or GP? or doctor? or prescriber? or group pract$ or institutional pract$ or partnership pract$ or family pract$ or
general pract$ or office pract$ or private pract$ or primary pract$ or nurse or nurses).tw.


























43. (continuing adj1 education).tw.
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(Continued)
44. (guideline? adj1 (disseminat$ or implement$ or compliance or adherence or distribut$)).tw.
45. ((drug? or pharmaceutic$ or prescrib$ or prescrip$) adj1 budget?).tw.
46. (incentive? adj1 (plan? or money$ or financ$ or payment? or reimburs$)).tw.
47. capitation.tw.
48. (salaries or salary or income? or wages or fringe benefit?).tw.
49. benchmarking.tw.




53. (letter? or mail$).tw.
54. (telephon$ or phon$).tw.
55. ((academic or group) adj1 detailing).tw.
56. fundhold$.tw.





62. ((prescrib$ or prescrip$) adj2 (attitude or variation? or behavior or behaviour or pattern? or practice? or habit? or accurate or
trend? or cost? or effect? or change? or shift$ or rational or reduc$ or improv$ or influenc$ or expenditure? or rate? or data)).tw.
63. (drug use? or drug utilization or drug utilisation).tw.
64. or/59-63
65. randomized controlled trial/
66. random$.tw.
67. experiment$.tw.
68. (time adj series).tw.












81. 19 and 58 and 64 and 76
82. 81 not 80
58Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers (Review)
Copyright © 2011 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appendix 3. Search strategies: Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group Register
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group Register, Idealist database
Searched terms anywhere in text
drug [or] drugs [or] pharmaceutic* [or] medicines [or] medicat* [or] prescrip* [or] prescrib*
Appendix 4. Search strategies: CENTRAL
CENTRAL, The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Ovid
Search fields: A combination of MeSH terms and text words
1. (regulat$ or requirement? or restrict$ or monitor$ or control$).tw.
2. (legislation? or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform$ or system? or plan$ or program$ or strateg$).tw. or Policy
Making/ or Legislation, Drug/ or Public Policy/ or Health Policy/ or Politics/ or Health Care Reform/
3. (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$).tw. or exp Pharmaceutical Preparation/ or Drug
Utilization/
4. (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$).tw. or exp Pharmaceutical Preparation/ or Drug
Industry/ or Drug Utilization/
5. (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ ormedicines ormedicament? ormedicat$).tw. or exp Pharmaceutical Preparation/ or Prescriptions,
Drug/ or Drug Utilization/
6. Drug Approval/ or (approv$ adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
7. Licensure/ and 4
8. Drug Labeling/
9. ((licens$ or registrat$ or label$) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
10. (6 or 7 or 8 or 9) and (1 or 2)
11. Classification/ and 3 and 2
12. ((classify$ or classification?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw. and 2
13. 11 or 12
14. 10 or 13
15. Patents/ and 4
16. (patent? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
17. ((profit$ adj3 (control$ or reduc$ or regulat$ or fix$ or restrict$)) and (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or
medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
18. (15 or 16 or 17) and (1 or 2)
19. (Marketing/ or Marketing of Health Services/ or Advertising/) and 4
20. ((advert$ or promot$ or market$) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
21. (19 or 20) and (1 or 2)
22. (Insurance, Hospitalization/ or Insurance, health, reimbursement/ or Reimbursement Mechanisms/ or Reimbursement, dispro-
portionate share/ or Reimbursement, incentive/) and 5
23. Insurance, pharmaceutical services/
24. ((reimburse$ or insur$ or (third party adj1 pay$) or benefit plan?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or pharmacy or pharmacies
or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
25. (22 or 23 or 24) and (1 or 2)
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(Continued)
26. Formularies/ and 5
27. Formularies, Hospital/ and 3
28. ((formulary or formularies or positive list? or negative list?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament?
or medicat$ or hospital?)).tw.
29. (26 or 27 or 28) and (1 or 2)
30. Drugs, Essential/
31. (essential adj3 (drug? or pharmaceutic$ or medicine? or medicament?)).tw.
32. ((drug? or pharmaceutic$ or medicine? or medicament?) adj3 list?).tw.
33. 31 and 32
34. 30 or 33
35. ((pre-authori#ation? or preauthori#ation? or prior authori#ation?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medica-
ment? or medicat$)).tw.
36. Reminder Systems/ and 5 and 2
37. (reminder? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw. and 2
38. Prescriptions, Drug/
39. (continu$ adj3 education).tw.
40. Education, Continuing/
41. Education, Pharmacy, Continuing/
42. (improv$ or incentive?).tw.
43. 39 or 40 or 41 or 42
44. 38 and 43 and (1 or 2)
45. (((prescrib$ or prescription?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)) and ((continu$
adj1 education) or (improv$ or incentive?))).tw. and (1 or 2)
46. (Guidelines/ or Practice Guidelines/ or Guideline Adherence/) and 2 and 5
47. (((guideline? or recommendation?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)) and
(disseminat$ or implement$ or complian$ or adherence)).tw. and 2
48. 46 or 47
49. (((generic$ adj3 prescrib$) or (generic$ adj3 prescription?)) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament?
or medicat$)).tw.
50. ((local$ or global$) adj3 budget$).tw.
51. (budget$ adj3 (general pract$ or GP? or physician? or doctor?)).tw.
52. 50 and 51
53. (fundhold$ adj3 (general pract$ or GP? or physician? or doctor?)).tw.
54. 52 or 53
55. 54 and 3
56. “Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee”/ and 2 and 5
57. ((drug? or formulary or pharmac$) adj3 committee?).tw. and 2
58. 56 or 57
59. (Drug Monitoring/ or Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/ or (safe$ adj1 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines
or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.) and 2
60. Product Surveillance, Postmarketing/ and 3 and 2
61. 59 or 60
62. 36 or 37 or 44 or 45 or 48 or 49 or 55 or 58 or 61
63. (Cost Control/ or Cost Savings/) and 5 and 2
64. ((control$ or containment or curtailment or reduc$ or save or saving) adj3 cost?).tw.
65. (cost? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
66. 64 and 65 and 2
67. ((control$ or reduc$ or cut$ or regulat$ or negotiat$ or fix$) adj3 (price? or pricing)).tw.
68. ((price? or pricing) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
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(Continued)
69. 67 and 68 and 2
70. (reference$ adj3 (price? or pricing)).tw.
71. ((price? or pricing) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
72. 70 and 71
73. (index$ adj3 (price? or pricing)).tw.
74. ((price? or pricing) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
75. 73 and 74
76. (maxim$ adj3 (price? or pricing)).tw.
77. ((price? or pricing) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
78. 76 and 77
79. (cost? effect$ adj3 (price? or pricing)).tw.
80. ((price? or pricing) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
81. 79 and 80
82. (reimbursement contract? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
83. (Drug Cost/ or Economics, Pharmaceutical/) and (1 or 2)
84. (Purchasing, Hospital/ or Group, Purchasing/) and 3
85. (purchas$ adj3 (group? or join$ or hospital? or shared)).tw.
86. ((group? or join$ or hospital? or shared) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
87. 85 and 86 and 2
88. (procurement$ adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw. and 2
89. (rebate? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw. and 2
90. 63 or 66 or 69 or 72 or 75 or 78 or 81 or 82 or 83 or 84 or 87 or 88 or 89
91. Marketing/ or Marketing of Health Services/ or Advertising/ or Licensure/ or Drug Labeling/
92. Pharmacies/ or Pharmacists/ or (pharmacy or pharmacies or pharmacist? or retailer? or wholesaler? or supplier? or dispens$).tw.
93. 91 and 92 and 3 and (1 or 2)
94. (advert$ or promot$ or market$).tw.
95. Pharmacies/ or Pharmacists/ or (pharmacy or pharmacies or pharmacist? or retailer? or wholesaler? or supplier? or dispens$).tw.
96. 94 and 95 and 3 and (1 or 2)
97. 93 or 96
98. ((control$ or reduc$ or regulat$ or fix$ or restrict$) adj3 profit?).tw.
99. (profit? adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
100. Pharmacies/ or Pharmacists/ or (pharmacy or pharmacies or pharmacist? or retailer? or wholesaler? or supplier? or dispens$).tw.
101. 98 and 99 and 100
102. (generic$ adj3 substitut$).tw.
103. (substitut$ adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
104. 102 and 103
105. (licens$ adj3 (pharmacy or pharmacies)).tw.
106. (((supply or supplies or distribut$ or sale$) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament$ or medicat$))
and (pharmacy or pharmacies or retailer? or wholesaler? or supplier? or dispens$)).tw. and (1 or 2)
107. 97 or 101 or 104 or 105 or 106
108. Cost Sharing/ and 5
109. (cost? adj3 (sharing or share)).tw.
110. ((sharing or share) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
111. 109 and 110
112. (out of pocket? adj3 pay$).tw.
113. (pay$ adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
114. 112 and 113
115. ((copay$ or co pay$) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
116. ((prescrib$ or prescription? or pharmaceutic$ or pharmacy or pharmacies or dispens$) adj3 (charg$ or fee?)).tw.
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(Continued)
117. ((charg$ or fee?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
118. 116 and 117
119. ((prescrib$ or prescription?) adj3 (limit$ or cap$)).tw.
120. ((limit$ or cap$) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
121. 119 and 120
122. ((coinsurance or deductible?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament$ or medicat$)).tw.
123. “Deductibles and Coinsurance”/ and 5
124. Fees, Pharmaceutical/
125. Prescription Fees/
126. Capitation Fee/ and 5
127. 108 or 111 or 114 or 115 or 118 or 121 or 122 or 123 or 124 or 125 or 126
128. Drug Information Services/ and (patient? or consumer?).tw. and 2
129. Drug Labeling/ and (patient? or consumer?).tw. and 2
130. Patient Education/ and 3 and (1 or 2)
131. ((educat$ or inform$) adj3 (patient? or consumer?)).tw.
132. ((patient? or consumer?) adj3 (drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medicines or medicament? or medicat$)).tw.
133. 131 and 132 and (1 or 2)
134. 128 or 129 or 130 or 133
135. 14 or 18 or 21 or 25 or 29 or 34 or 35 or 62 or 90 or 107 or 127 or 134
Appendix 5. Search strategies: CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
Search field: ’Key Words’
KW=(legislation OR law* OR act* OR policy OR policies OR politics OR reform* OR system* OR plan* program* OR strateg*
OR regulat* OR requirement* OR restrict* OR monitor* OR control)
AND
KW=(drug* OR pharmaceutic* OR medicines OR medicament* OR medicat*)
AND
KW=(random* OR intervention* OR control* OR compar* OR evaluat* OR time OR longitud* OR repeated measure* OR pretest
OR posttest OR pre test OR post test OR impact* OR chang* OR effect* OR experiment*)
Appendix 6. Search strategies: EconLit
62Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers (Review)
Copyright © 2011 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
EconLit, WebSPIRS
Search filed: ’Terms Anywhere’
regulat* or requirement or restrict* or monitor* or control* or legislation or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform* or
system? or plan* or program? or strateg*)
and
(drug? or pharmaceutic* or medicines or medicament? or medicat*)
and
(random* or intervention? or control* or compar* or evaluat* or time or pretest or posttest or pre test or post test or impact? or chang*
or effect? or experiment?)
Appendix 7. Search strategies: SIGLE
SIGLE, System for Information on Grey Literature in Europe, WebSPIRS
Search field: ’Terms Anywhere’
(regulat* or requirement or restrict* or monitor* or control* or legislation or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform*
or system? or plan* or program? or strateg*)
and
(drug? or pharmaceutic* or medicines or medicament? or medicat*)
and
(random* or intervention? or control* or compar* or evaluat* or time or pretest or posttest or pre test or post test or impact? or chang*
or effect? or experiment?)
Appendix 8. Search strategies: INRUD
INRUD, International Network for Rational Use of Drugs
Search field: ’All non-indexed fields’
{drug} or {pharmaceutic} or {medicines} or {medicament} or {medicat}
AND
{regulat} or {requirement} or {restrict} or {monitor} or {control} or {legislation} or {law} or {act} or {policy} or {policies} or {politics}
or {reform} or {system} or {plan} or {program} or {strateg}
AND
{random} or {intervention} or {control} or {compar} or {evaluat} or {time} or {pretest} or {posttest} or {pre test} or {post test} or
{impact} or {chang} or {effect} or {experiment}
63Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers (Review)
Copyright © 2011 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appendix 9. Search strategies: PAIS International
PAIS International, Public Affairs Information Service, WebSPIRS
Search fields: ’Descriptors’ or ’Title’ or ’Abstract’
1.((explode “Drug-stores” in DE) or (explode “Pharmacists” in DE) or (explode “Prescriptions” in DE) or (explode “Drugs” in DE)
or (explode “Pharmaceutical-industry” in DE)
OR
(( ((drug? or pharmaceutic* or medicines or medicament? or medicat*)) in AB )
OR
( ((drug? or pharmaceutic* or medicines or medicament? or medicat*)) in TI )))
AND
(( ((random* or intervention? or control* or compar* or evaluat* or time or pretest or posttest or pre test or post test or impact? or
chang* or effect? or experiment?)) in AB )
OR
( ((random* or intervention? or control* or compar* or evaluat* or time or pretest or posttest or pre test or post test or impact? or
chang* or effect? or experiment?)) in TI ))
AND
(( ((regulat* or requirement or restrict* or monitor* or control* or legislation or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform*
or system? or plan* or program? or strateg*)) in AB )
OR
( ((regulat* or requirement or restrict* or monitor* or control* or legislation or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform*
or system? or plan* or program? or strateg*)) in TI ))
2.((narco* or crim* or war? or terror* or weapon? or addict* or abus* or traffic* or illicit*) in AB)
OR
((narco* or crim* or war? or terror* or weapon? or addict* or abus* or traffic* or illicit*) in TI)
3. (1 AND 2) NOT 3
Appendix 10. Search strategies: International Political Science Abstracts
International Political Science Abstracts, WebSPIRS
Search field: ’Terms Anywhere’
(regulat* or requirement or restrict* or monitor* or control* or legislation or law? or act? or policy or policies or politics or reform*
or system? or plan* or program? or strateg*)
and
(drug? or pharmaceutic* or medicines or medicament? or medicat*)
and
(random* or intervention? or control* or compar* or evaluat* or time or pretest or posttest or pre test or post test or impact? or chang*
or effect? or experiment?)
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Appendix 11. Search strategies: NHS EED
NHS EED, National Health Services Economic Evaluation Database, CRD
Search fields: A combination of ’Subject Headings’ and ’All fields’
Search done in 6 separate stages
1.drug-approval or licensure or drug-labeling or classification or patents or marketing or marketing-of-health-services or advertising/
Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
AND
regulat or require or restrict or monitor or control or legislation or law or act or policy or policies or politics or reform or system or
plan or program or strateg/All fields
2.insurance-hospitalization or insurance-health-reimbursement or reimbursement- mechanisms or reimbursement-disproportionate-
share or reimbursement-incentive or insurance-pharmaceutical-services/Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
AND
regulat or require or restrict or monitor or control or legislation or law or act or policy or policies or politics or reform or system or
plan or program or strateg/All fields
3.formularies or formularies-hospital or drugs-essential or reminder-systems or prescriptions-drug or education-continuing or edu-
cation-pharmacy-continuing or guidelines or practice-guidelines or guideline-adherence/Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
AND
regulat or require or restrict or monitor or control or legislation or law or act or policy or policies or politics or reform or system or
plan or program or strateg/All fields
4.drug-monitoring or adverse-drug-reaction-reporting-systems or product-surveillance-postmarketing/Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
AND
regulat or require or restrict or monitor or control or legislation or law or act or policy or policies or politics or reform or system or
plan or program or strateg/All fields
5.deductibles or coinsurance or fees-pharmaceutical or prescription-fees or capitation-fee or drug-information-services or patient-
education /Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
6.cost-control or cost savings or drug-cost or economics-pharmaceutical or purchasing-hospital or group-purchasing or pharmacies
or pharmacists or cost-sharing/Subject Headings
AND
drug or pharmac or medicin or medica or prescri/All fields
AND
regulat or require or restrict or monitor or control or legislation or law or act or policy or policies or politics or reform or system or
plan or program or strateg/All fields
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Appendix 12. Search strategies: NTIS
NTIS, National Technical Information service
Search fields: A combination of ’Index Terms’ (KT), ’Key Words/Phrases’ (no tag) and ’Title’
#1. KT=PHARMACEUTICALS OR KT=DRUGS OR KT=MEDICATIONS OR KT= PRESCRIPTION DRUGS OR KT=
DRUG #PRESCRIPTIONS
#2. REGULAT* OR REQUIR* OR RESTRICT* OR LEGISLAT* OR LAW? OR ACT? OR POLICY OR POLICIES
#3. COMPAR* OR EVALUAT* OR EFFECT?
#4. NARCO* OR CRIM* ORWAR? OR ADDICT* OR ABUS* OR TRAFFIC* OR ILLICIT*
#5. TI=MANUAL? OR TI=CANCER OR TI=REGISTRATION FILE OR TI=RETIRED REGISTRANTS
#6. (#1 AND #2 AND #3) NOT #4
#7. #6 NOT #5
Appendix 13. Search strategies: IPA
IPA, International Pharmaceutical Abstract, WebSPIRS
Search fields: A combination of ’Descriptors’ and ’Terms Anywhere’
1.((approval*) in DE) or ((licensing) in DE) or ((licensure) in DE) or ((labeling) in DE) or ((classification) in DE) or ((patent*) in
DE) or ((marketing) in DE) or ((advertising) in DE) or ((insurance) in DE) or ((reimbursement) in DE) or ((formularies) in DE) or
((formulary) in DE) or ((essential) in DE) or (reminder system*) or ((Education-pharmaceutical-continuing) in DE) or ((Education-
continuing) in DE) or ((Hospitals-pharmacy-and-therapeutics-committee) in DE) or (drug* near1 monitoring) or ((Drugs-adverse-
reactions-reports) in DE) or ((Reports-drugs-adverse-reactions) in DE) or ((Costs-drugs) in DE) or ((Pricing-drugs) in DE) or (
(pharmacoeconomics) in DE) or (reference near2 pric*) or ((Costs-prescription-drugs) in DE) or ((purchasing) in DE) or (cost adj
sharing) or ((copayment*) in DE) or (deductibles) or (coinsurance) or ((drug information services) in DE) or (patient adj education)
(regulat* or restrict* or control* or legislat* or law or laws or act or acts or policy or policies or program or programs) and (control*
or compar* or evaluat* or time series or impact* or effect or effects) and ((sc=20) or (sc=22))
2.(regulat* or restrict* or control* or legislat* or law or laws or act or acts or policy or policies or program or programs) and (control*
or compar* or evaluat* or time series or impact* or effect or effects) and ((sc=20) or (sc=22))
3.(1 and 2) not sc=6
Appendix 14. Search strategies:OECD
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
Searched: Publications & Documents, limited to OECD Publications only
drug or drugs or pharmaceutical or pharmaceuticals or medicaments or medicines or prescription or prescriptions or prescribe or
prescribing
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Appendix 15. Search strategies: SourceOECD
SourceOECD
Search fields: ’Title’ or ’Abstract’
drug or drugs or pharmaceutic* or medicament* or medicines or prescrip*or prescrib*
Appendix 16. Search strategies: World Bank Documents & Reports
World Bank Documents & Reports
Limited to sectors: Health, Nutrition and Population or Hospitals, Secondary & Tertiary or Primary health or Reform and Financing
drug or drugs or pharmaceutical or pharmaceuticals or medicament or medicaments or medicines or prescription or prescriptions or
prescribe or prescribed or prescribing
Appendix 17. Search strategies: World Bank e-Library
World Bank e-Library
Search fields: ’Title’ or ’Abstract’ or ’Keywords’
drug or drugs or pharmaceutical or pharmaceuticals or pharmaceutic or pharmaceutics or medicament or medicaments or medicines
or prescription or prescriptions or prescribe or prescribed or prescribing
Appendix 18. Search strategies: JOLIS
JOLIS, The Library Network, serving the World Bank Group and IMF
Search field: ’Keywords Anywhere’. Search done in two separate stages
keywords anywhere “prescrib$ or prescrip$”
AND
keywords anywhere “drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medica$ or medicines”
AND
keywords anywhere “regulat$ or requirement$ or restrict$ or monitor$ or control$ or legislation$ or law? or act or acts or policy or
policies or politics or reform$ or system? or plan or plans or planning or program? or strateg$ or incentive$”
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Appendix 19. Search strategies: Global Jolis
Global Jolis, online catalogue for the World Bank Country Office PIC/Libraries
Search field: ’Words or Phrase’. Search done in two separate stages
1. prescrib$ or prescrip$
AND
drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medica$ or medicines
AND
regulat$ or requirement$ or restrict$ or monitor$ or control$ or legislation$ or law? or act or acts or policy or policies or politics 2.
prescrib$ or prescrip$
AND
drug or drugs or pharmaceutic$ or medica$ or medicines
AND
reform$ or system? or plan or plans or planning or program? or strateg$ or incentive$
Appendix 20. Search strategies: WHO
WHO (World Health Organisation), browsed The Essential Drugs and Medicines web site
Appendix 21. Search strategies: WHOLIS
WHOLIS, the WHO library database
Search field: ’Words or phrase’
words or phrase “prescrib$ or prescrip$”
AND
words or phrase “regulat$ or requirement$ or restrict$ or monitor$ or control$ or legislation$ or law? or act or acts or policy or
policies or politics or reform$ or system? or plan or plans or planning or program? or strateg$ or incentive$”
68Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers (Review)
Copyright © 2011 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
WH A T ’ S N E W
Last assessed as up-to-date: 13 May 2007.
Date Event Description
6 September 2011 Amended Minor change to plain language summary
H I S T O R Y
Review first published: Issue 3, 2007
Date Event Description
18 March 2009 Amended Correction to typographical error.
12 November 2008 Amended Minor changes
30 July 2008 Amended Converted to new review format.
14 May 2007 New citation required and conclusions have changed Substantive amendment
C O N T R I B U T I O N S O F A U T H O R S
MOA, AA and ADO prepared the protocol. JPK and HS commented on protocol drafts. HS, AA,MOA, and JPK applied the inclusion
criteria, assessed the quality and extracted the data for the included studies. CR further developed quality criteria (based on the EPOC
criteria) for interrupted time series (ITS) and repeated measures studies. CR and AV conducted statistical reanalyses for the ITS studies.
HS prepared the first draft of the report. The others commented on and contributed to subsequent iterations.
D E C L A R A T I O N S O F I N T E R E S T
MAhas previously carried out short-term pharmacoeconomic projects for the National Insurance Service and theNorwegian Medicines
Agency. From 1997-1999 he worked for a private company, Brevreklame, doing market research for pharmaceutical firms in Norway.
HS was supported by the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ).
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